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History teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to "national
security" may be used to justify a wide variety of repressive
government actions. A blind acceptance by the courts of the
government's insistence on the need for secrecy, without notice to
others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons, would
impermissibly compromise the independence of the judiciary and
open the door to possible abuse.'
I. Introduction
For more than eight years, the United States government has fought a
very expensive and highly controversial war on terrorism. 2 As questions have
arisen about the means chosen to fight this war, the battle has, in some cases,
moved into the federal courts. Given what is at stake, public interest in these
proceedings is usually high.
Tension can arise, however, between the government's need to protect
sensitive information and the judicial system's tradition of openness. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, the courts are public institutions with long
histories of public access. 3  While openness has the salutary effects of
promoting public accountability and understanding of the judicial system,
there is a fear that sensitive information used in the judicial process could find
its way into the wrong hands. 4 Courts have struggled to balance these
interests since the Supreme Court last weighed in on the public right of access
more than 20 years ago.
5
The tension between public information and secrecy is even more
pronounced when the government justifies secrecy based on "mosaic
theory"-the idea that even apparently innocuous information could be
1. In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1986).
2. Although the current administration appears to be avoiding use of the term "global war on
terrorism," the United States Department of Justice has called fighting terrorism its "top priority."
U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, FACT SHEET 08-807,JUSTICE DEPARTMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM
EFFORTS SINCE 9/11 (2008). A recent survey by the Government Accountability Office estimated
that Congress had appropriated $808 billion to the Department of Defense alone in support of the
global war on terrorism launched in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-449R, GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: REPORTED
OBLIGATIONS FOR THE DEPT. OF DEFENSE (2009).
3. See infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases defining the
First Amendment rights of access to judicial proceedings).
4. See, e.g., Michael Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15
(describing alleged security breaches as a result of public trials of terror suspects).
5. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (noting the uncertain scope of the Supreme
Court's First Amendment access cases).
harmful if pieced together by a knowledgeable observer.6 Mosaic theory has
had a profound impact on Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") litigation.
7
As terrorism-related cases play out in federal civil and criminal litigation,
mosaic theory has the potential to affect First Amendment access
jurisprudence as well. For example, in November of 2009, the Justice
Department announced plans to prosecute five alleged 9/11 co-conspirators
in a Manhattan federal court, despite concerns about the courts' ability to
protect classified information. 8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appcals recently
allowed a lawsuit to proceed over the government's argument that the suit
would result in the disclosure of secret information about extraordinary
rendition. 9 In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court ruled that prisoners
detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp had the right to challenge
their detention in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.' 0 In the first such case
to reach the federal district court level, the courtroom was promptly closed
after opening statements." The intense public interest in these and similar
cases-and the near certainty that sensitive information will have to be filed
with the court-will require federal courts to weigh the public's "right to
know" against the dangers of disclosure.
There is undoubtedly a public interest in national security, and secrecy is
sometimes necessary to further that interest. On the other hand, history has
shown that national security can be used as a pretext for unnecessary secrecy,
and secrecy itself breeds distrust of the government and contempt for the
6. As one court observed:
[T]he business of foreign intelligence gathering in this age of computer
technology is more akin to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the
management of a cloak and dagger affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of
seemingly innocuous information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal
with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate.
Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
7. See generally David E. Pozen, Comment, The Mosaic Theogy, Naional Securiy, and the Freedom of
Informalion Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005).
8. Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Citilian Trial in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2009, at Al. See also David Johnston, U.S. Will Give Al.Qaeda Suspect a Civilian Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2009, at Al (describing plans to bring federal criminal charges against Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri).
9. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cit. 2009).
10. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
11. William Glaberson, Judge Opens First Habeas Corpus Hearing on Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A21. The judge later ordered five of the six men who were party to that
proceeding to be released because the government lacked sufficient evidence to justify their
continued detentions. William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five Detainees Held Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2008, at Al.
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judicial system.12 Therefore, while some secrecy is legitimately necessary,
there is an equally strong public interest in transparency.
This article examines the judicial system's role in checking government-
imposed secrecy with respect to documents filed in federal court, with
particular emphasis on how mosaic theory does-and does not-change the
analysis. Part II discusses the relationship between public information and
national security, and examines legal and philosophical underpinnings of the
First Amendment right of access. 13 Part II also discusses the emergence of
mosaic theory, and discusses its treatment by the courts in different types of
cases before discussing its application to access jurisprudence. 14  Part III
explains the significance of the Supreme Court's access jurisprudence to
judicial documents.'5 Part III also argues that the mosaic theory threatens
First Amendment access rights and undermines judicial independence. 16
Although recognizing that deference may be appropriate in some cases, this
article concludes that mosaic theory should not be used to erode the
requirement that closure be supported by a specific showing of harm. 17
II. Background
A. The First Amendment, Information, and the Press
The First Amendmerit of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law.., abridging freedom of speech, or of the press ...."18
Scholars have debated the precise scope of this facially absolute provision
throughout history, but it is generally agreed that the First Amendment
recognizes the importance of information to democratic self-government. 19
The Founders saw the free flow of information as an important check on
government power. 20
12. See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text (discussing abuses of national security as a
pretext for imposing unnecessary secrecy).
13. See infra notes 18-117 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 40-78 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 153-162 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 163-98 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. See generaly Jeffery A. Smith, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM 28 (1999). See also Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("These expressly
guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government.").
20. See Jusice Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635-37 (1974) (arguing that
the Press clause serves as a structural check on government power). See also Smith, supra note 19, at
28. In rebuffing a broad request for closure of administrative proceedings, the Sixth Circuit stated:
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With its specific mention of the press, the First Amendment also seems to
recognize the role of third parties in disseminating information and opinions
to citizens. While the Supreme Court has recognized the role of news
organizations as a surrogate for the public,21 however, the Court has
repeatedly rejected special access privileges for the press.2 2 Thus, although
the Court has consistently been hostile to government censorship of printed
material, 23 it has accepted other restraints on the press.
B. Public Information and National Security
The relationship between public information and national security is
complicated. On the one hand, the public's compelling interest in national
security necessarily requires information control, which in turn requires
reasonable restrictions on public access. 24  On the other hand, national
security is highly newsworthy and public knowledge about national security
matters is no less important than any other aspect of government operations.
It is also not clear that greater secrecy leads to greater security; in fact, it may
even decrease security by diminishing the public's capacity to recognize and
respond to security threats. 25  Furthermore, the executive branch has a long
A government operating in the shadow of secrecy stands in complete opposition
to the society envisioned by the Framers of our Constitution. "Fully aware of
both the need to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial
governments, [the Framers of the First Amendment] sought to give this new
society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion
and assembly should not be abridged."
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J. concurring)).
21. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 572-73.
22. See, e.g. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (refusing to recognize First
Amendment right of access to prisons for purposes of reporting on prison conditions); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (plurality opinion) ("It has generally been held that the First
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally.").
23. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (internal quotations omitted) ("Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.").
24. E.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (recognizing national security as a compelling
interest); Dept. of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (recognizing a compelling interest in
withholding classified information for national security purposes).
25. See Pozen, supra note 7, at 674. See also Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrey: The Role Courts Should
Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrey, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 136-39 (2006) (discussing dangers of over
classification generally). According to Justice Stewart, public information is essentially the only check
on executive power in the national security arena:
In the absence of governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our
national life, the only effective restraint on executive power and policy in the areas
of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry -
2010]
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history of using "national security" as an excuse for excessive secrecy. Studies
have documented the use of national security as a pretext to shield potentially
controversial or embarrassing government operations from public view.26
There is perhaps no better example of this than N.Y Times v. United
States,27 commonly known as The Pentagon Papers Case, one of the most famous
cases to explore the tension between the First Amendment and national
security. In The Pentagon Papers Case, the government sought to enjoin the
NY Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a
Department of Defense study of the Vietnam War.28 The Court issued a brief
per curiam opinion holding that the government failed to carry the heavy
burden necessary to justify a prior restraint on publication, followed by
separate concurring opinions by each justice. 29 While the case is notable for
reaffirming the First Amendment's hostility to prior restraints, it is also
notable because the government's asserted national security interests in
restraining publication turned out to be "a mirage." 3°
In a similar vein is ExparteQuirin,31 in which a team of German saboteurs
were captured, convicted, and executed in a span of two months in the
summer of 1942.32 Separate teams of saboteurs landed on beaches in New
York and Florida with plans to destroy targets of strategic and symbolic
importance.33 To great fanfare, the FBI apprehended the men before they
could carry out the plan, and the men were tried and convicted in a military
commission proceeding that was closed to the public and the press. 34 The
Supreme Court denied the men's petitions for habeas corpus, 35 and six of the
eight were executed that summer. Years later, the declassified case file
in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values
of democratic government.
N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. See Fuchs, spra note 25, at 134-36; Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theogy and
Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 845, 867-68 (2006).
27. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
28. Id. at 714.
29. Three of the justices-Burger, Harlan and Blackmun-dissented. Id. at 748, 752.
30. BEN BRADLEE, A GOOD LIFE 323 (1995). Bradlee, the Washington Posfs managing editor
during the Pentagon Papers case, points out that none of the government officials involved in the case
ever contradicted Solicitor General Erwin Griswold's later confession that he had not seen "any trace
of a threat to national security from the Pentagon Papers publication." Id. (quoting from Griswold's
Feb. 15, 1989 op-ed in the Washington Pos.
31. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
32. See generally Edward J. Klaris et al., The Press and Pubic's First Amendment Right of Access to
Terrorism on Trial'A Position Paper, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 767, 782-89 (2005) (describing the
facts of the case).
33. Id. at 782-83.
34. Id. at 784-86 (describing the secrecy surrounding the trial).
35. Exparte.Qurin, 317 U.S. at 21.
revealed that the FBI had had little to do with foiling the Nazi plan; rather,
two of the saboteurs had defected and revealed the entire plan to authorities.
36
One of the prosecutors in the case later suggested that the "major reason" for
the trial's closure was to preserve the illusion that the FBI had foiled the plot
by itself.3 Two of the Supreme Court justices later indicated that they
regretted ruling so quickly.
38
C. Courts, Deference, and Mosaic Theory
1. Mosaic Theory Generaly
Although these cases illustrate how secrecy can be abused, there is little
question that the effective conduct of foreign and military affairs requires a
certain degree of secrecy. This often puts the judiciary in the position of
balancing the interests in secrecy against the interests of disclosure. In some
cases this is easy, such as when public disclosure would alert the target of an
investigation of the government's interest in him.39 Other cases present less
obvious dangers of disclosure. Modern intelligence gathering is like fitting
together a puzzle, in which inferences are drawn from seemingly disparate
pieces of information. 4
0
This theory of intelligence gathering is known as "mosaic theory.
'41
Mosaic making-essentially the inference-drawing process described above-
has long been recognized as an effective method of gathering intelligence.
42
Some of the puzzle pieces almost certainly come from public sources; training
material recovered from al-Qaeda camps, for example, indicates that terrorist
intelligence officers regularly mine government web sites for information.
43
Advances in technology have made mosaic making an even more powerful
tool. 44
Mindful of the sophistication of intelligence gathering, and perhaps
fearful of the consequences of being wrong, some courts are reluctant to
36. Klaris et al, supra note 32, at 787-88.
37. Id. at 788.
38. Id. at 789 (discussing the subsequent comments by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Douglas).
39. In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (FISA Ct. 2007)
(holding that public access to records of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would frustrate
the very purpose of the court).
40. Wells, supra note 26, at 853.
41. Id.
42. Id. See also NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATACKS UPON THE US, 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 88 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
43. Donald F. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Defense, Cable to RUHH subscribers (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/01/dodweb.html (describing al-Qaeda use of government web
sites to gather information).
44. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, at 88 (describing the use of technology in
intelligence gathering).
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challenge the executive branch's need for secrecy. In United States v. Marchetti,
the seminal case on the issue, the court reasoned as follows:
There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial review of
secrecy classifications. The significance of one item of information
may frequently depend upon knowledge of many other items of
information. What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear
of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may
put the questioned item of information in its proper context. The
courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in
foreign intelligence matters to serve efficiently in the review of
secrecy classifications in that area.
45
In the courts, mosaic theory has been applied not only to the classified
information that was at issue in Marchetti, but also to non-classified
information that is deemed sensitive by the executive branch. 46 The Marchetti
reasoning was later endorsed by the Supreme Court in CIA v. Sims, a FOIA
case in which the petitioners had sought disclosure of CIA research on
brainwashing techniques. 47 Thus, when the information could be part of a
mosaic, the impact of disclosing a particular document "must be evaluated not
only based on the information appearing within the four corners of the
document, but also with regard to secrets the document could divulge when
viewed in light of other information available to interested observers."
48
2. Mosaic Theogy in Praclice
In addition to court access cases, mosaic theory has had a significant
effect in three kinds of cases: Those involving FOIA, National Security
Letters, and state secrets. Although each of these bodies of jurisprudence is
analytically distinct, each requires the court to weigh necessity of secrecy
against the countervailing interests in disclosure. Each will be discussed in
turn.
45. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (enjoining former CIA
employee from publishing book about the agency). See also Pozen, supra note 7, at 638-41 (2005)
(tracing the origins of the mosaic theory from Marcheut). The Marchetti reasoning was later endorsed
by the Supreme Court in CIA v. Sims, a FOIA case in which the petitioners had sought disclosure of
CIA research on brainwashing techniques. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985). Sims, in turn, has
been cited by a number of federal courts to deny access under the Freedom of Information Act.
Pozen, supra note 7, at 643.
46. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cit. 2003).
The "sensitive but unclassified" designation began in the Reagan administration and was revived by
the George W. Bush administration. Wells, supra note 26, at 867.
47. 471 U.S. at 177-78.
48. Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cit. 2007) (denying historian's FOIA request for
Viemam-era presidential intelligence briefings).
a. Freedom of Information Act
49
Mosaic theory has had its greatest impact in FOIA litigation.50 The Act
contains nine categories of government information that are exempt from
disclosure under FOIA, including classified national security information and
information related to ongoing law enforcement investigations.51 Although
FOA grants district courts the power to review government classification
decisions de novo, the statute itself provides that the court is to afford
"substantial weight" to the agency's supporting affidavits, provided that they
are reasonably specific and there is no evidence of bad faith.5 2 Moreover, as
national security is a function of the executive branch, there is a natural
reluctance on the part of courts to conduct a searching inquiry into the
propriety of withholding national security information, and courts generally
afford a high degree of deference to agency's determination that disclosure
presents a security risk.5 3 Generally, if there is no evidence of bad faith and
the government's supporting affidavits specifically describe how the
information could compromise national security, the court's inquiry ends
there. 54
Although mosaic theory has been broadly endorsed by the courts, it has
also proven controversial because of its potential to shield broad categories of
information from the public.5 5 This controversy took center stage in Center for
National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice (hereinafter "CNSS").56 At
issue in CNSS was a request by various advocacy groups for broad disclosure
of information related to the government's post-9/11 detention of various
persons. 57 Noting that "the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to
second-guess the executive's judgment in this area of national security," the
court credited the government's argument that the list of detainees and the
circumstances of each arrest would provide terrorist organizations with "a
composite picture of the government investigation." 58 Moreover, the court
49. 5 U.S.C. S 552 (2006).
50. See generally Pozen, supra note 7.
51. 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b)(1), (7). FOIA also exempts information that is specifically exempted by
another statute, such as the National Security Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3). The FOIA does not apply
to information maintained by the federal courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (2006).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
53. See, e.g., Krikorian v. Dept. of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[A] reviewing
court must recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign
policy matters have unique insights into [national security matters]"); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144,
148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Judges ... lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions
in the typical national security FOIA case.').
54. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 145 (2009).
55. See Pozen, supra note 7, at 631.
56. 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cit. 2003).
57. Id. The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, the names of the individuals and details of their arrests.
58. Id. at 928. The court justified its deference as follows:
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held that releasing any of the information sought by the plaintiffs could
interfere with the investigation because even "bits and pieces" of seemingly
innocuous data could be used to map the government's investigation.
5 9
Judge Tatel authored a lengthy dissent.60 Conceding that withholding
some of the information may have been legitimate, Judge Tatel faulted the
court's "uncritical deference to the government's vague, poorly explained
arguments for withholding broad categories of information about the
detainees." 61 Although deference to the executive branch is appropriate in
national security matters, "requiring agencies to make the detailed showing
FOIA requires is not second-guessing their judgment about matters within
their expertise." 62 The government, according to Judge Tatel, should have
been required to make its case for secrecy detainee-by-detainee.
63
b. National Security Letters
The government has also used mosaic theory to justify a provision of the
USA PATRIOT Act that authorizes the collection of customer information
from internet service providers and bars the ISPs from disclosing the
existence of the inquiries. 64 This type of administrative subpoena is called a
National Security Letter ("NSL").65 In John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasy, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals partially invalidated these provisions on First
Amendment grounds. 66 More importantly for purposes of this discussion, the
[l]n undertaking a deferential review we simply recognize the different roles
underlying the constitutional separation of powers. It is within the role of the
executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security. It
is not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in
furtherance of that branch's proper role.
Id. at 932. Notably, the FBI's affidavit in support of its motion not been prepared specifically for the
case at hand, but rather for an unrelated case in Michigan. See Ctr for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept.
of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (D.D.C. 2002).
59. Ctrfor Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928-29. The government voluntarily released the
names of detainees who were criminally charged. Id. at 933. The court rejected the petitioners'
attempt to assert a First Amendment right of access to the information because the petitioners
sought broad disclosure of information related to all of the detainees, not just that of one individual.
Id. at 934.
60. Id. at 937-52.
61. Id. at 937.
62. Id. at 939.
63. Id. at 945.
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006). See also John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 865-68 (2d
Cir. 2008) (describing FBI program). In a previous round of litigation over the program, the
government had explicitly invoked mosaic theory to keep the identity of the NSL recipient a secret.
See Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D. Conn. 2005).
65. See Mukasy, 549 F.3d at 864.
66. Id. at 885.
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court rejected the statute's limited provision for judicial review, which
required the district court to treat the executive branch's determination of a
threat as conclusive absent a showing of bad faith. 67 According to the court,
the government might well be justified in enforcing the gag provision in the
interest of national security.68 That disclosure might compromise national
security, however, did not justify infringement on First Amendment rights.
69
To justify the gag order in a particular case, therefore, the government must
"at least indicate the nature of the apprehended harm and provide a court
with some basis to assure itself (based on in camera presentations where
appropriate) that the link between disclosure and risk of harm is
substantial." 7 0 To allow the government to rest on conclusory assurances of a
threat would "cast Article III judges in the role of petty functionaries, persons
required to enter as a court judgment an executive officer's decision, but




Another context in which the judiciary is required to scrutinize the
government's need for secrecy is when the government asserts the state
secrets privilege. In contrast to FOIA cases, in which the plaintiff is seeking
public disclosure of a document, the state secrets privilege arises when a civil
plaintiff seeks discovery of information that implicates diplomatic, military, or
intelligence-gathering tactics.7 2 Recognizing that the executive branch has
expertise in the area of national security, courts typically accord deference to
the executive's need for secrecy.7 3  The scope of the deference is not
unlimited, however, as "judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. '7 4 An independent, in camera
evaluation of the evidence for which the privilege is sought is therefore crucial
to avoid abuse of the privilege.75 As one court described its in camera review:
67. Id. at 881-83.
68. See id. at 882 Che Executive Branch's judgment that disclosure of the NSL threatens
national security "is not to be second-guessed, but a court must receive some indication that the
judgment has been soundly reached.').
69. Id. at 881.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citation omitted).
72. See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1931, 1935-36 (2007).
73. Mohamed v. Jeppensen Dataplan, lnc., 579 F.3d 943, 953 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Sealed Case,
494 F.3d 139, 144 (D.C. Cit. 2007).
74. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 953 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953)).
75. Id. at 959 n.8; AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir.
2007).
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We take very seriously our obligation to review the documents with a
very careful, indeed a skeptical, eye, and not to accept at face value
the government's claim or justification of privilege. Simply saying
"military secret," "national security" or "terrorist threat" or invoking
an ethereal fear that disclosure will threaten our nation is insufficient
to support the privilege. Sufficient detail must be ... provided for us
to make a meaningful examination. 76
As the scope of the disclosure is narrower in state secrets jurisprudence,
mosaic theory has perhaps left a smaller footprint in this body of
jurisprudence.7 7 Nevertheless, because state secrets cases expose executive
operations to potential scrutiny, the judiciary evaluates the need for secrecy in
much the same manner as FOIA cases.
The mosaic theory thus arises in a variety of contexts. The next section
of this paper examines the law of access to court documents in more detail.
This paper then discusses how courts have analyzed access cases, with a focus
on the few cases that have discussed mosaic theory.
D. Public Access to the Courts
1. Rights ofAccess in General
Accompanying every case filed in any federal court, whether criminal or
civil, is an often voluminous paper record of motions, memoranda, and
affidavits. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to
recognize a "newsgathering" right for reporters over and above the access
rights belonging to the general public. 78 Access to judicial records, therefore,
is rooted in the public's "right of visitation." 79
There is a long tradition of openness in the Anglo-American legal
tradition. English law recognized a general public right to inspect and copy
judicial records as early as 1372, but enforcement of this right was limited to
those with evidentiary or proprietary interest in the case.80 American courts
have generally imposed no such requirement, although courts have restricted
76. AI-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203.
77. But see, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (endorsing use of
mosaic theory and dismissing, on state secrets grounds, allegations that military had improperly
stored and disposed of hazardous waste); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (invoking
mosaic theory in the state secrets context). See also Wells, supra note 26, at 864 (noting "increasing"
use of mosaic theory in state secrets cases).
78. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
79. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980).
80. William Ollie Key, Jr., The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or
On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659, 666 (1982) (discussing common law right of access).
access to "sensitive" records, such as juvenile proceedings and divorce cases.
81
Courts are more willing to close these types of proceedings because the often
painful personal details that are revealed in a case would unnecessarily
embarrass private citizens.
82
The Supreme Court recognized the public nature of judicial documents as
early as 1834.83 A series of cases in the 1980s defined the nature of the public
rights of access to the courts, although each of these cases dealt with access to
proceedings as opposed to documents. The Supreme Court first recognized a
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers v.
Viginia.84 In that case, the trial judge in a state criminal trial had cleared the
courtroom at the request of the defendant's attorney, who feared that
excessive media coverage could prejudice his client's right to a fair trial.85 The
Virginia Supreme Court upheld the closure, but the United States Supreme
Court reversed. 86 The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger,
recognized that criminal trials had historically been open to the public, and
that openness contributed to the fairness, reliability, and legitimacy of the
proceedings. 87 In addition to these benefits, open trials have a "therapeutic
value" for a community in which a crime has occurred, "providing an outlet
for community concern, hostility and emotion." 88 Accordingly, the plurality
held that there is a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials that may
not be infringed "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated [by the trial
court.]"' 89 Chief Justice Burger also noted that, although the press had no
greater right of access than the general public, the press covered criminal
proceedings as "surrogates of the public." 90
In an influential concurrence, Justice Brennan wrote that whether a First
Amendment right of access attaches to the proceeding in question "must be
81. Id. at 667-68.
82. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (internal quotations
omitted) (noting that the court file in such cases could be used to "gratify private spite or promote
public scandal.").
83. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 593 (1834) (holding that publisher cannot have a copyright
on federal judicial opinions).
84. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
85. Id. at 559-61.
86. Id. at 555.
87. Id. at 569. Justice Burger's opinion traced the history of open trials back to pre-Norman
English history. Id. at 565. Justice Burger's opinion was joined by Justice Stevens and Justice White.
Id. at 558. Justice Brennan authored a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Marshall. Id.
at 584-98. Justice Stewart and Justice Blackmun each wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at
598-601, 601-04. Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 604-06.
88. Id. at 570-71.
89. Id. at 581.
90. Id. at 572-73. Other justices were more amenable to recognizing a "newsgathering right."
Id. at 583-84 (opinion of Stevens, J., concurring). See also id. at 585 n.2 (opinion of Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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strongly influenced by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment
of the specific structural value of public access in the circumstances." 91 If the
First Amendment right of access is implicated, only a compelling state interest
can reverse the presumption of openness. 92  Brennan noted, without
elaboration, that national security was one countervailing interest that may
warrant closure of a proceeding.
93
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, a majority of the Supreme Court
adopted Brennan's analysis. 94 In Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, Brennan
wrote the majority opinion as the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute
that required closure of court proceedings during testimony of rape victims. 9s
The Court held that the state had a compelling interest in protecting the
identities of such victims, but that complete closure of the proceedings was
not narrowly tailored to further that interest because the trial court had not
been required to make a particularized showing of necessity in the instant
case.96
This test-an analysis of (1) historical practice and (2) the practical
benefits of access in the particular situation-came to be known as the
"experience and logic" test.97 Although the experience and logic test has been
described by courts as a two-prong test, it should be noted that prongs are
interrelated, which suggests that the "test" should not be applied
mechanically. The Globe Newspaper Court noted: "This uniform rule of
openness has been viewed as significant in constitutional terms not only
'because the Constitution carries the gloss of history,' but also because 'a
tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience."' '98
The scope of this analysis has remained somewhat ambiguous. Because
Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper were decided in the context of
criminal trials, neither Court had occasion to define the scope of the test as it
related to documents that are filed with the court.
91. Id. at 597-98 (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring). Notably, Brennan mentioned that his
analysis applied to "proceedings or information," and thus conceived of the access right as applying
more broadly than to the trial itself. Id. at 589.
92. Id. at 598. This is consistent with First Amendment analysis in other contexts.
93. Id. at 598 n.24.
94. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
95. Id. at 598-602. Justice O'Connor concurred, expressing her belief that Richmond Newspapers
applied only in the context of criminal trials. Id. at 611. Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
dissented. Id. at 612.
96. Id. at 609.
97. E.g., North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2003).
98. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 589 (1980) (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring)). See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct.
(Press-Enterprise I), 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (describing logic and experience as "two complementary
considerations" that are related because "history and experience shape the functioning of
governmental processes").
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2. Access to Records and Documents
Although the Court's subsequent public access jurisprudence broadened
the categories to which the test applies, it provides little guidance as to the
ultimate scope of the test. In two cases involving the Press-Enterprise of
Riverside, California, the Supreme Court considered lawsuits by the
newspaper to unseal transcripts of pre-trial criminal proceedings that had been
closed to the public. 99 The Court held that the right of access attached to the
proceedings in both cases, and reaffirmed that the proceedings must remain
open unless the party seeking closure can articulate "an overriding interest"
and the court's closure order is narrowly tailored to that interest. 00 The
Court also refined its previous holdings to more clearly articulate the trial
court's responsibility to justify closure: "The interest is to be articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether
the closure order was properly entered."' 101 These findings must indicate a
"substantial probability" that closure will prevent the harm, as well as no
"reasonable alternatives" that will protect the interest asserted. 0 2 In both
cases, however, the Court's opinion focused on the right of access to the
proceedings themselves, leaving the scope of access to documents unclear. 103
Adding some confusion to the analysis, there is another case, which pre-
dates the Richmond Newspapers line of cases, that has been read by some courts
to bear on the appropriate degree of media access to court documents. In
Nixon v. Warner Communications, television stations sought copies of audio
recordings to tapes that had been played at the criminal trials of aides to
President Richard M. Nixon. 10 4 Transcripts of the tapes had been made
publicly available during and after the trial, but the television stations wanted
to broadcast the contents of the tapes.
10 5
The Supreme Court recognized that there was a long common law history
of access to judicial records. 106 The Court assumed that the common law
presumption of openness applied to the tapes, but held that there was only an
99. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984) (holding
that trial judge had improperly closed a six-week jury selection proceeding in a capital murder case
without articulating findings or considering alternatives to closure); Press-Enterprise I, 478 U.S. at 13
(holding that the First Amendment right of access attaches to preliminary hearing).
100. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. See also Press Enterprise I, 478 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Press-
Enterprise 1).
101. Press-Enteorise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
102. Press Enteprise I, 478 U.S. at 14.
103. See id. at 13 (mentioning the denial of the transcript, but holding that the right of access
attaches to the proceeding itself). See also Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Pub/k Access Doctrine,
27 CARDOZo L. REV. 1739, 1757-58 (2006) (discussing the confusing scope of Press-Enterprise II as it
relates to documents).
104. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 594 (1978).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 597.
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incremental public interest in requiring the court to allow copying of the
tapes. 07 This interest was outweighed by the risk that the tapes would be
selectively edited to "gratify private spite or promote public scandal."'
10 8
Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the trial court had not erred in
denying the right to copy the tapes. 10 9  The Court held that the First
Amendment did not apply to the media's request to copy the tapes because
there was "no question of a truncated flow of information to the public" in
light of the fact that the media had been allowed to listen to the tapes and had
been provided transcripts of the tapes, which they were free to use as they saw
fit."l 0
The scope of access rights articulated in the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases has been further delineated in the lower courts. Courts have expanded
the analysis in a somewhat haphazard, case-by-case manner."' Circuit courts
generally have extended the Richmond Newspapers analysis outside of the
criminal context. 112 Approaches to documents differ to some degree. 113
Some courts, though recognizing the ambiguous nature of Warner
Communications' First Amendment analysis, refuse to abandon that Court's
common law approach to the document question.114 Others recognize a First
Amendment right of access to the documents only after applying the Richmond
Newspapers test to the proceeding to which the documents attach."' Still
others apply the "logic and experience" test to the document itself.116 As one
commentator has shown, these divergent applications of the test have led to
107. Id. at 602. The Court also held that Congress had already provided for a process governing
public access to the tapes by passing the Presidential Records Act. Id. at 603.
108. Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 608.
110. Id. at 609. Justice Stevens dissented, noting that the content of the tapes was already in the
public domain, the presumption in favor of access and the "great historical interest" in the subject
matter of the case. Id. at 615-16 (opinion of Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. See In re the Application of the N.Y. Times Co. for Access to Certain Sealed Court Records
(In me N.Y. Times Applicalion), 585 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 n.4 (D.D.C. 2008) (commenting on the
"piecemeal" approach to expanding the test).
112. See Levine, supra note 103, at 1759 n.123 (collecting cases from the lower courts).
113. Id. at 1742-43.
114. Id. at 1742. In judging a media request to access of certain documents in the Oklahoma
City bombing case, for example, the Tenth Circuit noted a split within its own circuit as to whether
the common law or the First Amendment governed the media's request, although it did note that
Warner Commc'ns was inapplicable. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 813-14 (10th Cit. 1997).
The court declined to resolve the issue, but held that even if the First Amendment applied, the
sealing of the documents was justified to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial and was narrowly
tailored to that interest. Id. at 814-15. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit also typically analyzes access to
documents using both the common law and the First Amendment. See In re N.Y. Times Applicalion,
585 F. Supp. 2d at 87 n.3. The court noted that the First Amendment standard for justifying closure
was more difficult for the government to meet. Id. at 87 n.2.
115. Levine, supra note 103, at 1763.
116. Id.
inconsistent results in the lower courts. 117 Equally vexing, however, is the
degree of deference to afford the government's need for secrecy.
3. Deference to Executive Secregy
As in other kinds of access cases, First Amendment access cases present
questions of judicial competence to appropriately weigh the benefits of sealing
documents against the risks of disclosure. Some commentators have
suggested that courts appear to be favoring deference over disclosure. A 2005
report by the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press found that
secrecy had "become the default status for most proceedings even remotely
related to the war on terrorism" in the wake of the 9/11 attacks." 8 The
report concluded that restrictions on the right of access to such proceedings
constituted a "high risk to a free press."' 1 9
One of the more disturbing examples of this trend toward secrecy is the
case of M.K.B. v. Warden.120 According to the limited facts that are available to
the public about that case, M.K.B. was an Algerian-born waiter who was living
in Florida when he was arrested by immigration officials in the months
following the 9/11 attacks.' 2 ' After the immigration authorities initiated
deportation proceedings, M.K.B. filed a petition for habeas corpus. 122 The
case was not listed on the court's public docket, however, which means that
there was no official public record that the case even existed. 2 3 After the
clerk of the appellate court inadvertently disclosed the existence of the case by
listing it on the court's public calendar, the case was publicly docketed but all
documents related to the case were listed as "sealed."' 124 Thus, the case was
117. Id. at 1760-70 (documenting the inconsistent results reached by lower courts). Levine
suggests that the Court abandon the Richmond Newspapers test and apply strict scrutiny to all closure
requests. Id. at 1793.
118. REPORTER'S COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL: HOW
THE WAR ON TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO
KNOW 29 (Lucy A. Dalglish & Gregg P. Leslie eds., 2005). See also Levine, supra note 103, at 1791
(concluding that strict scrutiny of closure requests has been "infinitely flexible in fact').
119. REPORTER'S COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 118, at 29. The report uses
a threat level meter similar to that of the United States Department of Homeland Security. The
levels, in descending order of risk to press freedom, are as follows: Severe, High, Elevated, Guarded,
Low.
120. 540 U.S. 1213 (2004) (denying petition for certiorari).
121. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari., M.KB. v. Warden, No. 03-6747, 2003 WL 23139103, *3
(uly 1, 2003). The factual information in the petition was heavily redacted. Id. at *1.
122. Id. at*1.
123. Id. at *9. See also Meiah Thomas, Comment, The First Amendment Right of Access to Docket
Sheets, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1537, 1540-42 (2006) (describing the function of docket sheets in federal and
state courts).
124. Petition, 2003 WL 23139103 at *7--8. This brief error led to a story in the Daily Business
Review. Id. at *7.
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"heard, appealed, and decided in complete secrecy."' 25 At no time did any
court make any articulated findings justifying this extraordinary level of
secrecy. 126
The mosaic theory appears to have had less of an effect on court access
jurisprudence than it has in the related context of FOIA law. Cases from two
circuit courts, however, indicate how such arguments could fare. In Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft 127 and North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft,128 the Sixth and
Third Circuits, respectively, came to opposite conclusions regarding the
executive's authority to close deportation hearings when the subject of the
hearing was deemed by the government to be of "special interest" to the
investigation of terrorist groups. The Detroit Free Press court noted that
deportation hearings are quasi-judicial proceedings that are similar in many
respects to courtroom trials, thus implicating many of the same concerns
outlined in the Richmond Newspapers line of cases. 129  Rejecting the
government's mosaic theory argument, the court stated that:
there seems to be no limit to the Government's argument. The
Government could use its "mosaic intelligence" argument as a
justification to close any public hearings completely and categorically,
including criminal proceedings. The Government could operate in
virtual secrecy in all matters dealing, even remotely, with "national
security," resulting in a wholesale suspension of First Amendment
rights. 130
125. Petition, 2003 WL 23139103, at *9. It is not clear that mosaic theory was used as a
justification for closing the docket.
126. Id. at *16, *19-20, *23-24. In another recent case, a Texas judge issued a secret ruling in
response to a request by several American Muslim organizations to be removed from a list of
unindicted co-conspirators in a criminal case alleging illegal support for terrorism. Posting of Josh
Gerstein to Under the Radar, http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/1109/Judge.-snubbed-
US-Islamic-groupsinsecretruling.html (Nov. 1, 2009, 22:27). The case was not listed on the
public docket until a reporter called to ask about the decision. Id. The Third Circuit recently
announced that it would no longer allow appellate dockets to be sealed. U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, Notice to the Bar (Nov. 4, 2008) (available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/
Public%20Notices/seal-dockets-webNov08.pd). The announcement was made after a legal
newspaper challenged a ruling by the Third Circuit affirming the sealing of the docket in a Tide VII
employment discrimination case.
127. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002).
128. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002).
129. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696-700.
130. Id. at 709. See aLso Levine, supra note 103, at 1790 ("The most pressing problem with the
mosaic argument is, of course, that there is no way for a court to second-guess the government's
assertion that an information release will implicate national security.").
Because the government sought blanket closure of all deportation
proceedings that it designated as "special interest," closure was not narrowly
tailored to the facts of individual cases.
131
In North Jersey Media Group, a divided Third Circuit panel came to the
opposite conclusion. The court concluded that a blanket closure order on
"special interest" immigration proceedings was appropriate because a case-by-
case approach to closure decisions could itself tip off terrorists as to ongoing
government investigations. 132 Although closure of the hearings amounted to
"a complete information blackout," the court was ultimately persuaded by the
FBI's mosaic argument. 133  The court found insufficient evidence that
deportation proceedings had historically been open, and also held that it was
illogical to apply a presumption of openness when the executive branch had
identified the hearing as a national security threat: "[s]ince the primary
national policy must be self-preservation, it seems elementary that, to the
extent open deportation hearings might impair national security, that security is
implicated in the logic test."' 134 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving
the split intact.13
5
Some courts have made efforts to preserve some degree of transparency,
even when the cases have national security implications. In Parhat v. Gates,'
36
considering a request by the government to seal all unclassified law
enforcement information contained in filings related to a Guantanamo
detainee, the court admonished the government for its "generic explanation of
the need for protection" which "provid[ed] no rationale specific to the
information actually at issue in th[e] case."' 137 The court provided the
government with 30 days to make a specific justification for secrecy related to
that proceeding. 138 Similarly, in the criminal case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who
was convicted for his participation in the 9/11 attacks, the Fourth Circuit held
that the government must justify continued sealing of non-classified
information, and bifurcated oral argument to allow for as much of the
131. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710.
132. NorthJersy Media Group, Inc., 308 F.3d at 218. Judge Sirica dissented, arguing that case-by-
case review was neither impracticable nor a threat to national security. Id. at 227-29.
133. Id. at 200-03 (summarizing the affidavit of the FBI's counter terrorism chief.
134. Id. at 202 (emphasis added). The court quoted extensively from the affidavit of the FBI's
counterterrorism chief, which contained a litany of harms that might occur from open immigration
hearings. See id. at 218. Accepting these harms at face value, the court stated: "We are quite hesitant
to conduct a judicial inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, as national security is an
area where courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive expertise." Id. at 219.
135. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
136. 532 F.3d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Parhat is one of hundreds of cases in which a
Guantanamo detainee has sought review of his detention.
137. Id. at 836.
138. Id. at 837.
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proceeding to take place in open court as possible. 139 The district court in
that case issued orders limiting the length of time for which orders can be
sealed.1
40
Two district courts in the District of Columbia recently rejected broad,
indefinite requests for secrecy. In In re N.Y. Times Application, the court
unsealed search warrant affidavits from a completed investigation into a series
of anthrax attacks on government and media offices.' 4' The court redacted
the affidavits to conceal the identity of a confidential informant, but otherwise
rejected the government's request that the records be sealed indefinitely.142
Similarly, in In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Lif'gation, the court rejected a
mosaic theory argument to justify sealing of factual information about the
arrests and detentions of hundreds of suspected terrorists housed at
Guantanamo Bay.'43  The government had resisted disclosure of the
information, arguing that "the sum of small pieces of information such as
those contained in the returns at issue here 'can be analyzed and fitted into
place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate."" 44
The court, however, found that argument "devoid of specificity."' 145
4. The Risks ofAccess
Transparency in the judicial system has its risks. For example, when
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was on trial for a plot to bomb several New
York targets in 1995, the government revealed a list of 200 unindicted alleged
co-conspirators, at least some of whom had been unaware that they were
being investigated by the government. 146 Some, such as former Attorney
General Michael Mukasey, have even argued that the 9/11 hijackers used
139. United States v. Moussaoui, 65 Fed. Appx. 881, 887-90 (4th Cir. 2003). The court,
however, declined to conduct a de novo review of the government's decision to classify certain
information. Id. at 887 n.5.
140. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-CR-455A, 2002 WL 32001783, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept.
27, 2002).
141. In reN.Y Times Applhation, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
142. Id.
143. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2009).
144. Respondents' Response to Press Applicants' Motion to Intervene at 11, In re Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Litigation, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (Misc. No. 08-0442) (quoting Halkin v.
Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cit. 1978)). The government also argued that it accidentally released
some classified information in its filings to the court, and needed an unspecified amount of time to
review its filings and remove the classified information. Id.
145. In r Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 630 F. Supp.2d at 6. The court set a deadline
for the disclosure of the information. Id. at 7.
146. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, at 472 n.8 (noting that the unintended effect of
these trials). It should be noted that the government did not apparently seek a protective order for
this information. See JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR. & RICHARD P. ZABEL, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 88 (2008) (available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf).
information made public by the trials of the planners of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing to avoid detection by government authorities.
1 47
Openness may also have indirect costs. Opening all court files may
discourage the use of judicial institutions that are themselves designed to act
as a check on executive power, such as the Foreign Intelligence Security
Court.148 Open courts may also discourage the government from prosecuting
national security crimes. For example, the Justice Department recently
decided to drop espionage charges against two lobbyists in part because the
prosecution may have resulted in the disclosure of classified information.
149
The extent to which public court records have actually compromised
national security is disputed, however.'50 Federal courts have a number of
tools that seek to balance the tradition of openness with the need for secrecy.
Most prominent among these is the Classified Information Procedures Act,
which governs the use of classified information when the information must be
used in a federal prosecution.' 5' A 2008 study of terrorism prosecutions in
the federal courts concluded that any security breaches that have occurred in
federal terrorism prosecutions have happened because the government itself
147. See Michael B. Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15.
Mukasey, who later became the United States Attorney General, argued that testimony about a cell
phone battery in trial of the World Trade Center bombers tipped off al-Qaeda that one of its phones
had was no longer secure. Id. Mukasey concluded that "such prosecutions risk disclosure to our
enemies of methods and sources of intelligence that can then be neutralized. Id. Disclosure not only
puts our secrets at risk, but also discourages allies abroad from sharing information with us lest it
wind up in hostile hands." Id. See also Pozen, supra note 7, at 650 (describing "widespread belief" in
intelligence community that the trial of the first World Trade Center bombers had led to security
breaches).
148. See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496 (FISA Ct. 2007)
(declining broad request for release of FISC records); United States v. Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252,
1259 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (recognizing the propriety of closure when publicity would frustrate the
very purpose of the proceeding).
149. Jerry Markon, U.S. Drops Case Against Ex-Lobbyists, WASH. POST, May 2, 2009, at A01
(quotingJustice Department officials).
150. A 2008 study of terrorism trials in the federal courts disputed some accounts of the security
breaches that had allegedly occurred in the federal courts, including the one discussed in the Mukasey
article. See BENJAMIN & ZABEL, supra note 146, at 88. The authors of the report found no evidence
of "any important security breach in any terrorism case in which CIPA has been invoked." Id. See
also Bill Keller, Trials and Tribulations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, at A31 ("Neither the Justice
Department nor prosecutors in New York could recall for me a single specific instance when
national security was actually compromised during (the World Trade Center bombing trials] in New
York."); Klaris et al., s~pra note 32, at 804-17 (describing federal terrorism trials since the 1980s and
noting that the trials remained largely open with relatively few restrictions on access).
151. 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2006). When classified information must be used in a criminal
proceeding, CIPA provides for in camera review by the presiding judge to determine if the
information is relevant to the proceeding. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(a), (d). If the judge determines that the
information is relevant, the judge may order the government to delete certain classified parts of the
information, present an unclassified summary of the information, or stipulate to what the classified
information would tend to prove. 18 U.S.C. app. § 4. Of course, CIPA itself does not have any
bearing on public access rights. See, e.g., Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
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failed to appropriately protect the information, not because the courts have
improperly refused to close dockets or proceedings. 152
III. Analysis
This section argues for strict scrutiny of requests to seal documents in
federal courts. First, this section discusses the importance of document
access in the courts. Next, this section argues that mosaic theory has the
potential to undermine strict scrutiny by allowing for general, categorical
secrecy. This section also argues that the federal courts have a long track
record of appropriately handling sensitive information. Although deference
may be appropriate in some cases, the judiciary must remain vigilant in
protecting fundamental public access rights.
A. Denials of Access to Documents Infringes on First Amendment Rights
1. History Supports BroadAccess Rights to Court Records.
The salutary effects of openness in the courts have been discussed
above. 53 The courts have long recognized the public nature of their work.
154
In R'chmond Newspapers, the Court traced the history of open criminal
proceedings back to the beginnings of the Anglo-American common law
tradition.155 A presumptive public access right to judicial documents has
similarly deep roots. I5 6 Although courts have historically put limits on the
enforceability of the right and the class of documents to which the
presumptive access applies, such limits are usually intended to protect the
privacy interests of private civil litigants. 157 Due to the relationship between
national security information and government operations, such interests are
virtually nonexistent in national security cases, particularly in cases where the
performance of public officials is examined or where the defendant is on trial
for acts of terrorism. In addition, even where courts have limited access, the
circumstances under which documents are sealed are typically narrow.
15 8
152. BENJAMIN & ZABEL, supra note 146, at 88. See also Klaris et al., supra note 32, at 835-36
(collecting anecdotal evidence of the successful use of CIPA to protect classified information).
153. See supra notes 18-38, 79-96 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 80-83 (discussing the historical context of public access).
155. See spra note 87 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing common law history to
documents).
157. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the practice of limiting access to
documents in English and American courts).
158. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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2. Access to Documents Plays a Crudal Role
The rationales for an open judicial system have added significance with
respect to records maintained by the courts, particularly when the case has
national security implications. Cases involving national security necessarily
deal with information that is of broad public interest to people outside of the
geographic region in which the proceeding is taking place. Thus, as the
interest in the case increases, the ability of interested individuals to monitor
the proceedings decreases. Documents on file with the court may provide for
more complete and comprehensive news coverage of the event, and in fact
may be the sole means by which an interested citizen can follow the case on
his or her own. Thus, although a court's decision to close a proceeding is not
necessarily ameliorated by providing access to documents related to that
proceeding, 159 access to documents serves an even more important purpose
and should be subject to an even more rigorous analysis.
Access to documents also could provide insight into proceedings for
which access has itself been denied. Opening a search warrant proceeding,
for example, would not make sense because allowing access to the proceeding
at which the warrant is granted could alert the subject of the warrant,
undermining the very purpose for the proceeding. 160  Allowing post-
investigation access to the warrant affidavit, however, would not implicate this
concern. It would also protect against government overreaching, and would
provide for a greater public understanding of the case, which was one of the
animating principles of the Richmond Newspapers line of cases. 161 Restricting
access to paper records of legitimately closed proceedings would also result in
a presumption of permanent secrecy, which almost certainly is much broader
than necessary to protect the government's interests. 1
62
B. The First Amendment Demands a Detailed Argument to Support Closure
There is no question that the government has a compelling interest in
national security. 163 This is only the beginning of the First Amendment
analysis, however. After establishing a compelling interest, the government
must provide that closure is narrowly tailored to that interest; i.e., it must
identify for the court exactly what information compromises national security
159. See Levine, supra note 103, at 1764.
160. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of closing a proceeding
where the very purpose of the proceeding would be frustrated by publicity).
161. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text (discussing Richmond News).
162. See supra notes 92, 100 and accompanying text (discussing consistency between First
Amendment right of access analysis and First Amendment analysis in other contexts). See also supra
note 115 (discussing some courts' approach of sealing documents of closed proceedings).
163. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (recognizing a compelling government interest in
national security).
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and how it does so. 164 As the Court in Press-Enteprise I held, the court must
make specific findings as to why closure is necessary. 165 For the court to
make such findings, of course, the government must provide a basis for doing
so.1
6 6
Mosaic theory threatens to weaken the narrow-tailoring requirement by
allowing for a more general, less-detailed argument. For example, in CNSS,
the government's mosaic argument was based on an affidavit that had
previously been used in a completely different case. 6 As narrow tailoring
requires a specific connection between the document and the potential harm,
a generic affidavit could not be used to support closure under the First
Amendment right of access. Moreover, there is a difference between a
generalized assertion of a threat and a particularized argument as to what is
threatening. This particularized argument should not be impossible for the
government to make; given the executive branch's own skill at constructing
intelligence mosaics, 168 the government itself should be able to explain to the
court how the information could be aggregated with other information in a
useful (and harmful) way. 16 9 When not even the government, with its own
sophisticated mosaic-making capability, can explain the threat posed by a
piece of information, the court should be skeptical that such a threat exists.
The fundamental nature of the rights at stake in a First Amendment
access case also support a searching review of the justification for secrecy.
The First Amendment was intended to preserve a healthy democracy by
protecting the free flow of information. 170 Although the Supreme Court has
indicated that the burden to justify newsgathering restrictions is less onerous
than that to justify a prior restraint, 171 a restriction on information has a
similar chilling effect on public discourse. As the Mukasey court recognized,
even a minor infringement on First Amendment rights demands a searching
judicial inquiry. 172 It therefore rejected Congress' attempt to circumscribe its
standard of deference, and required the government to support its secrecy
argument with more than conclusory speculation. 73 Along the same lines,
164. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining the standard of review for the gag
provision of the Reauthorization Act).
165. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 69-71 (requiring specific facts to justify an infringement of First
Amendment rights).
167. See supra note 58.
168. See supra note 42 (describing the government's use of mosaic intelligence gathering
methods).
169. See Wells, supra note 26, at 876. See aLrso Pozen, supra note 7, at 677.
170. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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because secrecy requests also implicate important First Amendment rights,
courts should require a secrecy request to be supported by a detailed
argument.
C. Courts Should Protect Only as Much Information as Necessary to Protect
National Security
Because mosaic theory posits that the risk of openness is basically
impossible to know, mosaic arguments could be used to impose almost
limitless secrecy. 174 Broad secrecy carries the potential for abuse; as Exparte
Quirin and The Pentagon Papers Case illustrate, national security can be used as a
pretext to shield authorities from public scrutiny. 175 Thus, even recognizing
mosaic intelligence gathering as legitimate, the degree of secrecy that a generic
mosaic argument would allow for creates a potential for abuse, and is plainly
at odds with the narrow tailoring required by the First Amendment.
It is easy to appreciate the risk posed by some information, such as the
identity of a confidential informant or certain techniques used in law
enforcement and intelligence-gathering. 176 Even so, narrow-tailoring dictates
that only information that compromises national security should be hidden
from public view, and the information should be hidden only as long as is
necessary to serve the interest.1 77 The court, therefore, can simply order that
the information be redacted, and may impose a deadline for disclosure.
178
The narrow tailoring requirement would not, however, be consistent with
removing an entire case from a public docket, as occurred in M.KB. 179 The
level of secrecy in that case had the effect of allowing the entire case to take
place outside of public view.18 0 As the Third Circuit recently recognized, the
information contained in docket sheets does not implicate any legitimate need
for secrecy.181 Thus, such a drastic curtailment of access would generally not
be warranted, especially without any evidence of specific findings to justify
closure.1
82
174. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (quoting Detroit Free Press). See also supra notes 55-
63 and accompanying text (discussing controversy of broad mosaic claims in FOIA jurisprudence).
175. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the redaction of confidential
informants names).
177. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (discussing less restrictive means than total
closure).
178. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing redaction of confidential informant's
case in In re N.Y. Times Appcation). See also supra notes 138, 140 (discussing court-imposed deadlines
for producing documents).
179. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 126 (discussing the Third Circuit's recent memorandum to the bar that
appellate dockets would be presumptively open).
182. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting lack of specific findings in M.KB.).
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D. Narrow Tailoring Requires Case-by-Case Analysis
Case-by-case review is neither impracticable nor at odds with national
security.' 83  Court access cases generally implicate a narrower kind of
disclosure than many FOIA cases. In CNSS, for example, the plaintiff sought
to use the FOIA to obtain access to a broad range of information. 184
Whether that case was correctly decided or not, it is easier to see how such
sweeping disclosures could have revealed important details about a
government investigation. By contrast, a case involving one party, such as
Parhat, has a much smaller likelihood of allowing an interested observer to
draw broad inferences about an ongoing investigation. 185 By the same token,
such a case presents a smaller administrative burden on the government to
show how the individual might fit into the mosaic. This may explain why the
same judge who embraced the mosaic argument in CNSS rejected a general
request for secrecy in Parhat18 6
Even where a group of cases present similar facts or procedural postures,
broad, categorical arguments are inconsistent with First Amendment access
rights. In the Guantanamo Bay Detainee decision, for example, the court refused
to allow a general mosaic argument to apply to the entire set of cases.
E. Federal Courts Can Effectively Exercise a Searching Review
Because the mosaic theory relies on the judiciary's comparative lack of
expertise in national security, mosaic arguments seem to presume that federal
judges are unable to grasp the potential danger posed by the release of
information. 187 This does a disservice to the judiciary and ignores the federal
courts' long track record of dealing with sensitive national security
information. 88 Under CIPA, in particular, judges are called upon to review
and evaluate highly sensitive information, including classified information. 189
The courts' experience with CIPA also demonstrates that judicial review of
183. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Sirica's dissent in North Jersey
Media Group).
184. See sapra note 57.
185. See sopra note 137 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 56, 136.
187. See Wells, supra note 26, at 854 ("[Mosaic theory] uses the judge's lack of expertise as a
reason to refuse to provide information that might education the judge (on the never quite-spoken
assumption that it would be mishandled), thus further hampering judicial resolution of disputes.").
See also Pozen, supra note 7, at 664 ("Whereas a typical [FOIA] exemption claim involves only one
piece of information, the standard argument runs, mosaic claims involve multiple pieces of
information interacting with each other in potentially nonobvious ways; as a result, mosaic claims are
more difficult for judges to evaluate and so demand additional deference.").
188. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (describing procedures available to federal
courts for dealing with sensitive or classified information).
189. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
secrecy requests need not itself be a security risk.190 As one commentator
noted, there is no record of any security breach in a case where CIPA has
been invoked.' 91 Although a lack of security breaches does not, by itself,
mean that a breach will not occur, the federal judiciary's successful use of
CIPA does indicate a degree of competence to evaluate and handle sensitive
information.
Requiring the government to explain how documents containing
potentially sensitive information could compromise national security if
disclosed to the public does not jeopardize public safety. The Mukasy court,
among others, endorsed the propriety of in camera review of the arguments in
support of secrecy. 192 Even the judge's order can be filed and reviewed under
seal. Although in camera review and sealed orders do not provide the public
with access-and thus has the disadvantage of removing the judicial process
from public view-the requirement that the court make contemporaneous
and detailed findings in turn requires the government to present a basis for
those findings. The judiciary thus acts as a check on the executive's power to
keep secrets.
193
F. Overreliance on Mosaic Theory Undermines Judicial Independence
As recent cases, such as Mukasey and Mohamed, recognize, the judiciary is
an independent, co-equal branch of government. 194 The judiciary, not the
executive branch, has traditionally had control of the evidence in cases
brought before it, and therefore judges have not been chary about
independently evaluating state secrets cases. 195 Likewise, the judiciary has a
long history of controlling public access to the courts. 196 Moreover, it is the
role of the courts, not the executive, to say when state action infringes on
constitutionally protected rights. 197 As in other facets of national security
litigation, therefore, federal judges should be skeptical of vague, categorical
arguments in support of secrecy.
G. Deference May be Appropriate in Some Cases
The "substantial probability" standard articulated in Press-Enterprise II
leaves some room for uncertainty about the actual threat presented by of
190. See spra notes 150-52 (describing history of terrorism prosecutions in the federal courts).
191. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
192. See e.g., supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing the in camera review of evidence in
Aukasy)
193. See sepra notes 71, 74-76 (describing the necessity of judicial checks on executive secrecy in
the NSL and state secrets context, respectively).
194. See supra notes 71, 75 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 80-81 (discussing common law history of access).
197. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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disclosure. Deference to executive threat assessment may therefore be
appropriate in some cases, even if the court itself may have doubts as to the
relationship between the information and the likelihood of harm. That
secrecy can be abused does not mean that information control is unnecessary.
Federal judges appropriately recognize that foreign and military affairs are
complicated areas that are the province of the Executive branch. 198 Thus,
where the government can show the existence of a particular threat and
provide a substantial connection between the threat and a given piece of
information, it may be appropriate to keep the document sealed. Although a
judge's decision to release information would be only tangentially connected
to any subsequent national security crisis, there could be real-world
consequences to imprudent disclosure. Threat assessment is, after all, an
inexact science; access jurisprudence does not require that the future be
predicted with absolute certainty.
IV. Conclusion
Democracy relies on informed decision-making. 199 Accordingly, courts
have recognized that the First Amendment implicitly includes certain
informational rights that can only be infringed when the government can
articulate a compelling interest and uses narrowly tailored means to advance
that interest. 200 Court records historically have been an important source of
information, and this tradition of openness has contributed to public
confidence in the court system and to the fairness of the judicial process. 20 1
Information is no less critical (and is perhaps more so) because it relates
to national security. 202  Because of the structural importance of these
informational rights to democracy, and because of the courts' role as a check
on the other branches of government, the courts must be vigilant in requiring
the government to justify its need for secrecy.
Reliance on mosaic theory threatens the availability of public information
by weakening the First Amendment right of access. Although mosaic theory's
impact on court secrecy cases so far has been limited, cases such as North Jersey
Media Group indicate that some courts may be willing to credit mosaic
arguments to support broad access restrictions. 203  Such categorical
restrictions are plainly at odds with the free flow of information that is
198. See spra note 45 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 80-82, 87-88 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of an informed
public).
203. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
fundamental in a democracy, and allow for unbridled executive secrecy. 2°4 A
particularized, searching analysis of secrecy arguments is therefore essential to
preserve the democratic ideals protected by the First Amendment.
204. See supra notes 19-20, 129-31 and accompanying text.
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